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THE BRITISH BANK NATIONALIZATIONS: AN INTERNATIONAL
LAW PERSPECTIVE
N JANSEN CALAMITA*
Abstract The British Government’s nationalization of the shares of
Northern Rock plc and Bradford & Bingley plc in 2008 raises important
issues about the standard of protection owed to the banks’ non-UK investors
and the manner in which compensation should be calculated. The United
Kingdom is party to numerous bilateral investment treaties as well as the
European Convention on Human Rights, which adopt an international stan-
dard of protection for foreign investors and require the payment of ‘market
value’ compensation for the property taken. As the analysis in this article
shows, the compensation scheme established by the British Government
appears to fall short of these obligations.
On 18 February 2008, the Government of the United Kingdom nationalized
Northern Rock plc, a bank publicly traded on the London Stock Exchange.
Thereafter, on 12 March 2008, the Government brought into effect the
Northern Rock plc Compensation Scheme Order 2008 (CSO), which estab-
lished a framework for determining the amount of any compensation payable
to former shareholders of the now nationalized Northern Rock. The CSO
framework places signiﬁcant restrictions on the permitted manner of valuing
the nationalized shares in the company. Instead of providing for payment of
the market value of the shares at the time of nationalization, the effect of the
CSO is to require that the shares be given a liquidation value (which by most
accounts will likely be zero). The CSO makes no distinctions between foreign
investors and UK investors in applying this valuation methodology. All are
treated alike for purposes of compensation under the Order.
While the structure of the CSO may have appeared equitable to the creators
of the Scheme—treat foreign investors in the same way as British investors—
the CSO framework raises questions with respect to the United Kingdom’s
obligations under international law. The United Kingdom is party to numerous
bilateral investment treaties (BITs) as well as the European Convention on
Human Rights, all of which adopt an international standard for the payment of
compensation to foreign investors in cases of nationalization. That standard
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requires that the United Kingdom provide compensation in an amount equal to
the ‘market value’ of the property taken from the foreign nationals. The CSO,
however, seems to prohibit the payment of market value compensation by
placing restrictions on the permitted manner of valuing Northern Rock’s
shares. As a result, the compensation process established under the CSO ap-
pears to run contrary to the UK BITs and the rules of customary international
law.
Northern Rock is not the only bank to have been nationalized by the British
Government. On 29 September 2008, the UKTreasury announced the national-
ization of another bank, Bradford & Bingley plc. The terms of compen-
sation for Bradford & Bingley’s shareholders are not yet known. As of this
writing the UK Treasury has not brought forth an order to establish a com-
pensation scheme for Bradford & Bingley shareholders. It remains to be seen,
therefore, whether the compensation scheme applicable to Bradford &
Bingley shareholders will raise the same issues as the Northern Rock scheme
has done.
Part I provides a brief background to the ﬁnancial difﬁculties in which
Northern Rock found itself in the latter half of 2007 and the beginning of 2008
and outlines the terms of the UK nationalization and the shareholder com-
pensation framework set up by the CSO. Part II looks at the standard of
compensation required by the UK BITS and the European Convention on
Human Rights for the expropriation of property owned by foreign nationals.
Part III looks at the question of valuation under the UK BITS and the
Convention.1 Part IV addresses the circumstances of the Bradford & Bingley
nationalization and whether the ﬁnancial crisis of September 2008 has given
rise to conditions of necessity which might justify a temporary departure from
the ordinarily applicable rules of international law.
I. THE NATIONALIZATION OF NORTHERN ROCK
On Sunday 17 February 2008, the UK Government announced that it would
bring forward legislation to nationalize all shares in Northern Rock.2 It was a
remarkable change in fortune for the company. Northern Rock had been the
United Kingdom’s ﬁfth-largest mortgage bank.3 Just one year earlier the
company had reported proﬁts of over £400 million and underlying assets
worth £100 billion.4 On 6 February 2007, the share price of Northern Rock
closed on the London Stock Exchange at a record high: £12.58 per share.5 One
1 The focus of this paper is on the international legal aspects of the nationalization. The
legality of the CSO under principles of UK administrative law is not considered except to the
extent that the international principles discussed herein may have bearing on the application of
UK domestic law. See, eg The Human Rights Act 1998.
2 UK Treasury, Northern Rock plc Press Release 16/08 (17 Feb 2008).
3 Northern Rock plc, Annual Report and Accounts 2006 2.
4 ibid 103. 5 Thompson Datastream.
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year later, however, at the time of the nationalization of its shares, the com-
pany had taken on billions of pounds of debt in facilities arranged with the
Bank of England and the UK Treasury, and there were concerns about its
ability to remain solvent.6 On its last day of trading, Friday, 15 February 2008,
shares in Northern Rock closed at 90 pence per share.7 The company had gone
from a market capitalization of £7.8 billion in February 2007 to just £559
million one year later.
A. Nationalization
On Monday, 18 February, following the UK’s Government’s Sunday an-
nouncement, the UK Financial Services Authority (FSA) suspended trading in
shares of Northern Rock prior to the opening of the London Stock Exchange.8
Later that week, on 21 February 2008, the Banking (Special Provisions) Act
2008 came into force, providing the UK Treasury with the authority to bring
Northern Rock into government ownership.9 On Friday, 22 February 2008, the
Treasury issued the Northern Rock plc Transfer Order 2008, which effected
the nationalization of all shares in Northern Rock.10
B. The Northern Rock Compensation Scheme
In addition to providing authority for the Treasury to take the shares of
Northern Rock into public ownership, the Banking (Special Provisions) Act
required that the Treasury make an order establishing a ‘a scheme for de-
termining the amount of any compensation payable by the Treasury to persons
who held the securities immediately before they were so transferred.’11 The
Banking (Special Provisions) Act contained speciﬁc guidance to the Treasury
as to the terms under which a Northern Rock compensation scheme would
operate. In particular, section 5(4) of the Act states:
In determining the amount of any compensation payable by the Treasury by
virtue of any provision in an order under this section, it must be assumed—
(a) that all ﬁnancial assistance provided by the Bank of England or the Treasury
to the deposit-taker in question here, Northern Rock, has been withdrawn
(whether by the making of a demand for repayment or otherwise), and
6 For an overview of Northern Rock’s difﬁculties, particularly during the period from
September 2007 through January 2008, see House of Commons Treasury Committee, The Run on
the Rock, Fifth Report of Session 2007–08, Vol I (24 Jan 2008). See also the synopsis in Northern
Rock plc, Annual Report and Accounts 2007.
7 See Northern Rock plc, Strategic Review Update Press Release (18 Feb 2008). Share price
data available from Thompson Datastream.
8 UK Financial Services Authority, Notice of Temporary Suspension of Listing from
the Ofﬁcial List (18 Feb 2008). 9 Banking (Special Provisions) Act 2008 (c 2).
10 SI 2008/432, section 2(1). 11 ibid s 5(1)(a).
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(b) that no ﬁnancial assistance would in future be provided by the Bank of
England or the Treasury to the deposit-taker in question (apart from ordinary
market assistance offered by the Bank of England subject to its usual
terms).12
On 13 March 2008, the Treasury issued the Northern Rock plc Compensation
Scheme Order 2008.13 Under the CSO, an ‘independent valuer’ is to be ap-
pointed by the Treasury to determine the amount of any compensation payable
by the Treasury to the former shareholders of Northern Rock.14 Although the
valuer is characterized as ‘independent,’ in keeping with the terms of the
Banking (Special Provisions) Act, the CSO strictly limits that independence
with respect to two of the valuer’s most important tasks: (a) the establishment
of the legal standard under which compensation shall be awarded and (b) the
determination of the valuation method by which such compensation shall be
calculated.
The CSO provides that ‘[t]he amount of compensation payable to a person
shall be an amount equal to the value immediately before the transfer time
of all shares in Northern Rock held immediately before the transfer time15
by that person.’16 This broad statement, however, is subject to an important
caveat. Under section 6 of the CSO:
In determining the amount of any compensation payable by the Treasury to any
person . . .. it must be assumed (in addition to the assumptions required to be
made by section 5(4) of the [Banking (Special Provisions)] Act (compensation
etc. for securities transferred etc.)) that Northern Rock—
(a) is unable to continue as a going concern; and
(b) is in administration.
The CSO further requires that the valuer ‘shall determine’ the amount of any
compensation payable by the Treasury in accordance with these assump-
tions.17
At the time of the Transfer Order, there were 421.2 million ordinary shares
of Northern Rock outstanding.18 In addition, there were 200 million shares of
preference stock outstanding.19 Financial information resources suggest that
while most shareholders appear to have been UK nationals, large amounts of
Northern Rock’s shares also appear to have been held by non-UK nationals,
although because information about the identity of the shareholders of
12 ibid s 5(4). 13 SI 2008/718. 14 ibid s 7.
15 Under section 2, ‘the transfer time’ means the beginning of 22nd February 2008.
16 S 3(2). 17 S 7(2).
18 Northern Rock plc, Annual Report and Accounts 2007 84.
19 ibid. In addition, 100 million ‘Foundation Shares’ were held by The Northern Rock
Foundation, a charitable organization established in 1997 at the time Northern Rock became
a public limited company, ibid 24. According to the company’s 2007 Annual Report, the
Foundation shares ‘carried no rights to dividends but ranked pari passu with the Ordinary Shares
in respect of other distributions and in the event of a winding up.’ ibid 85.
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Northern Rock is not a matter of public record much of this information is far
from precise.20
The valuation process established under the CSO makes no distinction be-
tween the compensation payable to UK investors in Northern Rock, on the one
hand, and foreign investors on the other. Given international principles of non-
discrimination against foreign nationals, this is perhaps not surprising.
However, merely providing foreign investors with the same treatment as
national investors does not insulate the State from claims that the treatment on
offer falls below an international minimum standard or standards guaranteed
under treaties. In the debates in the House of Lords introducing the CSO, it
was put to Lord Davies, the Government Deputy Chief Whip, that the exist-
ence of treaties between the United Kingdom and other states might require
that higher standards of compensation would need to apply to the treatment
of foreign investors, resulting in foreign investors receiving greater compen-
sation for their Northern Rock investments than domestic investors.21 In
response, Lord Davies offered the following view:
The Government are determined that all shareholders shall be equal with regard
to the position of Northern Rock. I have heard the reﬂections, which were also
made in the other place, that certain international treaties will safeguard share-
holders based abroad and give them more favourable treatment than other
shareholders. First, that is not so. Secondly, in all equity, it ought not to be so. I
cannot think of anything being less fair to the ordinary small shareholder . . . .
Nothing could be more offensive to the small shareholder than the idea that
someone based abroad would be able to take advantage of bilateral treaties that
were designed to—and this has been accurately reﬂected in discussion today—
safeguard, on the whole, British taxpayers regarding regimes that can act on
occasion in an extremely arbitrary and unfair manner.22
Contrary to the implication of Lord Davies’ comments, however, the standard
of protection for foreign investors in cases of expropriation is set by principles
of public international law, not national law alone. This is true whether the
investor is protected by one of the United Kingdom’s numerous bilateral in-
vestment treaties (BITs), the European Convention on Human Rights, or
customary international law. For foreign investors, therefore, the CSO is not
the last word, even though for national investors it is likely to provide as much
protection as they can reasonably expect to receive.23
20 Large non-UK shareholders seem to have included UBS AG (Switzerland), Toronto
Dominion Bank (Canada), Bank of America (US), Lazard Limited (Bermuda), Socie´te´ Ge´ne´rale
(France). See, eg FAME database of UK and Irish companies, Bureau van Dijk Electronic
Publishing. Northern Rock’s two largest shareholders at the time appear to have been SRMGlobal
Master Funder LP, a Cayman Islands-based limited partnership (approx 11.5 per cent) and
RAB Capital plc, a UK company (approx 7 per cent).
21 Hansard HL Deb cols 1473–74 (Baroness Noakes) (11 Mar 2008).
22 ibid cols 1481–82 (emphasis added).
23 As discussed below, the European Convention on Human Rights does place some limits on
the manner in which the United Kingdom may treat domestic investors. These limits, however,
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Whether one considers this a case of foreign investors being treated too well
or Parliament not treating UK investors well enough, the international law on
the subject seems relatively clear. While the United Kingdom has great sov-
ereign discretion to determine how it treats investors with UK nationality, the
international agreements to which the United Kingdom is a party place limits
on that sovereignty with respect to foreign investors. Of course if the CSO
provided compensation that was in accord with international standards, there
would be no problem. However, as the analysis below suggests, the CSO
appears to fall short under international standards and to leave the United
Kingdom in breach of its international obligations.
II. OF BITS AND HUMAN RIGHTS—THE STANDARD OF COMPENSATION FOR NORTHERN
ROCK SHAREHOLDERS
A. The Standard of Compensation for Expropriation under the UK BITs:
‘Prompt, Adequate and Effective’ Compensation
The United Kingdom has concluded over 100 bilateral investment treaties
(BITs)24 with other states, of which 91 are in force.25 All contain provisions
addressing the standard of compensation to be used in the event that the
property of an investor from one of the contracting states is nationalized by the
other contracting state. These treaties create obligations for the United
Kingdom in international law and limit the United Kingdom’s capacity to
make unilateral determinations as to the manner in which foreign investors
should be treated, particularly in cases of nationalization or expropriation and,
importantly, regardless of the way in which the United Kingdom decides to
treat its own nationals. Because the United Kingdom has historically been a
capital-exporting state, the UK BITs will have been negotiated on the as-
sumption that UK investors would be the ones to beneﬁt from the protections
contained therein.26 Nevertheless, the BIT standards apply reciprocally.
Generally speaking, all of the United Kingdom’s BITs use substantially
similar language to indicate the level of protection owed to foreign investors
are rather minimal and the Court of Human Rights’ standard of review in such cases is very
deferential to the State’s decisions.
24 In the special parlance of the Foreign & Commonwealth Ofﬁce, the UK BITs are referred
to as Investment Promotion and Protection Agreements (IPPAs). This article will use the more
commonly used international term—BITs—when referring to these agreements.
25 According to the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), as of
1 June 2007, the UK had signed 103 BITs, ninety-one of which were in force. See http://
www.unctad.org/sections/dite_pcbb/docs/uk.pdf.
26 As noted by Lord Shawcross, one of the originators of the ill-fated OECD Draft Convention
on the Protection of Foreign Property: ‘The quid pro quo for the borrowing States’ undertaking is,
in fact, in the English vernacular, the provision of the quids, that the capital importing countries in
return for agreeing to abide by the generally recognized procedures of international law, will
receive more private investment and with the capital, the beneﬁts of the technical and commercial
skills which go with them than would otherwise be the case.’ Quoted in E Snyder, ‘Protection of
Private Foreign Investment: Examination and Appraisal,’ (1961) 10 ICLQ 469, 492.
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in cases of expropriation.27 In nearly all UK BITs the standard of compen-
sation payable to a foreign investor whose property has been expropriated or
nationalized is to be judged against the classic Hull formula:28 expropriation
may only be undertaken in the ‘public interest’ and only upon the payment of
‘prompt, adequate and effective’ compensation.29 In adopting the language of
the Hull formula, the UK BITs are in accord with a vast number of the more
than 2,500 BITs which have been concluded worldwide.30
1. When is compensation ‘adequate’? The signiﬁcance of variations in the
UK BITs
The Hull formula’s use of the term ‘adequate’ of course begs the question of
what compensation will be considered adequate. In an effort to answer this
question, many BITs, including virtually all of those to which the United
Kingdom is a party, provide, in addition to the invocation of the Hull formula,
elaboration on the measurement of adequate compensation. The 1975 UK-
Singapore BIT, for example, provides:
Such [prompt, adequate and effective] compensation shall amount to the market
value of the investment expropriated immediately before the expropriation or
impending expropriation became public knowledge.31
In more recent UK BITs, the reference to ‘market value’ has been replaced
by the phrase ‘genuine value.’ The 1992 UK-United Arab Emirates BIT thus
provides:
Such [‘prompt, adequate and effective’] compensation shall amount to the gen-
uine value of the investment expropriated immediately before the expropriation
or before the impending expropriation became public knowledge, whichever is
the earlier . . . .32
27 See E Denza & S Brooks, ‘Investment Protection Treaties: United Kingdom Experience’
(1987) 36 ICLQ 908. The text of the current UK Model BIT (2005) is reprinted in R Dolzer & C
Schreuer, Principles of International Investment Law (OUP, Oxford, 2008) 376.
28 In 1938, in an exchange of diplomatic notes with the Government of Mexico, US Secretary
of State Cordell Hull wrote that ‘under every rule of law and equity, no government is entitled to
expropriate private property, for whatever purpose without provision for prompt, adequate and
effective compensation.’ The diplomatic exchanges between Mexico and the United States which
led to the articulation of the Hull formula are excerpted at length in A Lowenfeld, International
Economic Law (OUP, Oxford, 2002) 397–403.
29 In a small number of BITs, the United Kingdom has agreed to different formulations of the
standard of compensation, see eg, UK-China BIT, TS No 33 (1986), Art 5 (‘reasonable com-
pensation’ amounting to the ‘real value’ of the investment); UK-Hong Kong, BIT, TS No 9
(2000), Art 5 (‘compensation’ amounting to ‘real value’); UK-India (1995), Art 5 (‘fair and
equitable compensation’ amounting to ‘genuine value’).
30 See (70) and accompanying text.
31 UK-Singapore BIT, TS No 51 (1975), Art 5(1). This formulation is followed in relevant
part in over 28 other UK BITs.
32 UK-United Arab Emirates BIT, TS No. 24 (1994), Art. 6(1). This formulation is followed
in relevant part in over 47 other UK BITs.
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Some commentators have questioned whether the provision in one BIT for
compensation amounting to the ‘market value’ of the investment might call
for a different appraisal of compensation than that provided in another BIT
indicating that compensation shall amount to the ‘genuine value’ of the ex-
propriated investment.33 It is a question worth asking. In addition to these
variants, one could also note the formulation used in the UK-Russia BIT,
requiring ‘adequate and effective compensation’ amounting to the ‘real value
of the investment,’34 or the UK-Bangladesh BIT, requiring ‘prompt, adequate
and effective compensation’ amounting to the ‘full value of the investment.’35
Must these all mean the same thing?
Generally speaking, the interpretation of compensation standards under
BITs has not been the most nuanced of exercises. There is a deﬁnite trend in
the Western commentary to give short shrift to variations in language de-
scribing the level of compensation so long as the BIT is taken as referring in
sum and substance to the Hull formula. Thus, terms like ‘market value’,
‘genuine value’ and ‘full value’ when used in BITs have largely been treated
as synonymous with each other and with the Hull formula.36
This conclusion seems sound, at least where, as with the majority of UK
BITs, terms like ‘market value’ and ‘genuine value’ are used in conjunction
with a textual inclusion of the Hull formula’s ‘prompt, adequate and effective’
standard this conclusion seems sound.37 Under the Vienna Convention on the
Law of Treaties, the terms of a treaty are to be interpreted in accordance with
their ordinary meaning in the context in which they occur.38 As a result of
its frequent articulation as a standard of customary international law,39 and
its inclusion in numerous BITs, the Hull standard of compensation in cases
of expropriation has developed a precise meaning in international law. In
particular, the ‘adequacy’ of compensation under the Hull formula has come
33 See M Sornarajah, The International Law of Foreign Investment: Second Edition (CUP,
Cambridge, 2005) 242–43; CF Amerasinghe, ‘Issues of Compensation in the Taking of Property
in the Light of Recent Cases and Practice’ (1992) 41 ICLQ 22, 30.
34 UK–Russia BIT, TS No 3 (1992), Art 5(1).
35 UK–Bangladesh BIT, TS No 73 (1980), Art 5(1). See also UK-Malaysia BIT, TS No 16
(1989), Art 4(1) (‘prompt, adequate and effective compensation’ reﬂecting the ‘value of the
investment’).
36 See, eg Lowenfeld (n 28) 482, R Dolzer & M Stevens, Bilateral Investment Treaties
(Martinus Nijhoff Publishing, The Hague, 1995) 109–110; Irmgard Marboe, ‘Compensation and
Damages in International Law: The Limits of “Fair Market Value”’ (2006) 7 J World Trade &
Invest 723, 730 (2006); M Ball, ‘Assessing Damages in Claims by Investors Against States’
(2001) 16 ICSID Rev For Invest LJ 408, 414. Accord UNCTAD (2004) Key Terms and Concepts
in IIAs: A Glossary 73.
37 For those BITs which do not include the Hull formula, however, and merely refer to
‘reasonable compensation’ or ‘real’ or ‘genuine’ value, it is an open question whether one should
automatically equate such language with ‘market value.’ See, eg E Denza & S Brooks,
‘Investment Protection Treaties: United Kingdom Experience,’ (1987) 36 ICLQ 908 (discussing
the negotiation of the UK–China BIT).
38 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Art 31(1). See Competence of the General
Assembly for the Admission of a State to the United Nations [1950] ICJ Rep 4, 8.
39 See Part II.
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to refer rather concretely to the payment of ‘market value’ as compensation
for expropriated property.40 Thus, for example, the World Bank in its
Guidelines on the Treatment of Foreign Direct Investment states that
‘[c]ompensation will be deemed “adequate” if it is based on the fair market
value of the asset as such value is determined immediately before the time at
which the taking occurred or the decision to take the asset became publicly
known.’41 UNCTAD has taken a similar position,42 and arbitral tribunals have
reached the same conclusion as well.43
Given that ‘adequate’ compensation under the Hull formula means ‘market
value’ compensation, it is reasonable to use that meaning to inform the in-
terpretation of ambiguous terms like ‘genuine,’ ‘real’ or ‘full’ found in certain
UK BITs. This view ﬁnds support in the decision of the arbitral tribunal
in CME Czech Republic BV (Netherlands) v Czech Republic. There, the
Netherlands-Czech Republic BIT provided that in the event of an expropri-
ation, the expropriating state would be required to make ‘payment of just
compensation’ amounting to ‘the genuine value of the investment affected.’44
Reﬂecting upon whether the use of the phrases ‘just compensation’ and
‘genuine value’ contemplated a standard of compensation different from that
of the Hull formula and the standard of ‘market value,’ the Tribunal concluded
that it did not. In the tribunal’s view the terms were synonymous with the Hull
formula; full market value was required.45 Here, it is not necessary to stretch
the interpretation that far. The UK BITs expressly include the Hull formula in
their terms. The standard of compensation to be paid, therefore, is market
value compensation.46
40 See Marboe, ‘Compensation and Damages in International Law: The Limits of “Fair
Market Value” ’ (2006) 7 J of World Trade & Invest 723.
41 World Bank, Guidelines for the Treatment of Foreign Direct Investment (1992) Art IV, s5
2 & 3, reprinted in 31 ILM 1363, 1379.
42 UNCTAD, International Investment Agreements: Key Issues (2004) Vol 1 239.
43 See, eg American Int’l Group, Inc. v Islamic Republic of Iran Award No 93-2-3, 4 Iran–US
CTR 96, 106 (19 Dec 1983) (applying customary international law).
44 CME Czech Republic BV (Netherlands) v Czech Republic, Final Award (14 March 2003),
para 496.
45 Ibid para 497. See Compan˜ia del Desarrollo de Santa Elena SA v Costa Rica, ICSID Case
No ARB/96/1, Award (17 Feb 2000), paras 69–70; Southern Paciﬁc Properties (Middle East) v
Egypt (1992) Award ICSID Case No ARB/84/3, Award (20 May 1992), para 197.
46 In any case, the operation of most-favoured-nation (MFN) clauses found in the UK BITs
may make academic any debate about the linguistic equivalence of ‘genuine value’ and ‘market
value’ or ‘just compensation’ and ‘prompt, adequate, and effective compensation.’ MFN clauses
act to ensure that the parties to an agreement treat each other in a manner at least as favourable as
they treat third parties on matters coming within the scope ratione materiae of the MFN. The
MFN clauses in the UK BITs are drafted in uniformly broad terms and should apply with respect
to the provisions addressing compensation for expropriation. See eg, UK-Hong Kong BIT, TS No
9 (2000), Art 3; UK Model BIT, Art 3(3). Most-favoured-nation clauses like those contained in
the UK BITs have been invoked to deﬁne the applicable standards of protection and compensation
in investor-state cases. Thus, in the CME arbitration, the tribunal, in addition to viewing ‘genuine
value’ as linguistically synonymous with ‘fair market value,’ also relied upon the MFN clause
contained in the Netherlands-Czech Republic BIT to conclude that ‘fair market value’ was the
appropriate measure of compensation. The BIT between the United States and the Czech Republic
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2. The signiﬁcance of BIT standards to covered Northern Rock investors
Neither the CSO, nor the Banking (Special Provisions) Act sets a clear stan-
dard for the compensation that is to be paid to the owners of nationalized
Northern Rock shares. Instead, both instruments refer obliquely to ‘any com-
pensation payable.’ The UK BITs, however, set a standard of compensation
applicable to the investments of nationals from the States which are parties to
them. These BITs set the standard of compensation in terms of the market
value of the property taken immediately before the expropriation or before the
impending expropriation became public knowledge, whichever is the earlier.
That is the level of compensation which the United Kingdom is obligated to
pay investors covered by the UK BITs. As a result, regardless of the ambiguity
created by Parliament’s reference to ‘any compensation payable,’ regardless
of the valuation assumptions imposed by the CSO and the Act, and regardless
of Lord Davies’ comments, with regard to those investors covered by UK
BITs, the United Kingdom has an obligation to follow the standard forth in
those BITs. The fact that UK nationals will not beneﬁt from this international
standard and will be processed instead under the CSO’s vague standard is the
United Kingdom’s decision to make. As to foreign investors, however, the
United Kingdom bargained that discretion away when it entered into the BITs.
B. The Standard of Compensation under the European Convention on
Human Rights: Different Degrees of Protection for Nationals and
Non-Nationals
The European Convention on Human Rights provides an additional source of
protection in cases of expropriation. Unlike the UK BITs, the Convention
applies to all investors in Northern Rock: UK nationals, nationals of one of
the Convention’s Contracting States, and nationals of States who are not
parties to the Convention. However, the standard of protection provided by the
Convention is not the same for all investors. In its case law the European
Court of Human Rights has indicated that the standard of protection for
property rights, including the compensation required for expropriation, differs
signiﬁcantly depending upon the nationality of the claimant. Thus, where in-
terference with property rights is at the hands of the claimant’s own state of
nationality, the standard of compensation will be assessed according to the
provided in terms for compensation to be equivalent to the fair market value of the expropriated
investment immediately before the expropriatory action was taken and the Dutch investor could
rely upon that provision. CME Czech Republic para 500. See also Bayindir Insaat Turizm Ticaret
Ve Sanayi AS v Pakistan Decision on Jurisdiction, ICSID Case No ARB/03/29 (14 Nov 2005),
paras 231–232; MTD Equity Sdn Bhd v Chile, ICSID Case No ARB/01/7, Award (25 May 2004),
para 187. For a critical appraisal of the application of MFNs in investor-state arbitrations, see
J Ku¨rtz, ‘The Delicate Extension of Most-Favoured-Nation Treatment to Foreign Investors:
Maffezini v Kingdom of Spain’ in T Weiler (ed) International Investment Law and Arbitration
(Cameron May, London, 2005) 523.
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Court’s rather deferential European human rights jurisprudence, whereas
when the interference is at the hands of a state other than the claimant’s own,
customary international law will provide the standard. As shown below, for
UK investors this means that the Convention provides a lesser standard of
protection for their investments than it does for the investments of foreign
nationals.
1. The two-tier system of protection
Compensation for the expropriation of property was a controversial issue in
the Council of Europe’s negotiations on the European Convention on Human
Rights.47 While there was wide agreement that in the event of expropriation
compensation must be paid, the negotiating States were unable to agree on
how to formulate a standard for that compensation.48 This was not a matter of
States disagreeing about the standard which ought to be applicable to the
treatment of foreign investors. Instead, the disagreement concerned what re-
strictions, if any, States would be willing to place upon their treatment and
compensation of their own nationals. As a result of the disagreements on the
treatment of domestic claims, the language ultimately included in Article 1 of
Protocol No 1 makes no reference to compensation at all. Instead, Protocol No
1 provides in relevant part: ‘No one shall be deprived of his possessions except
in the public interest and subject to the conditions provided for by law and by
the general principles of international law.’49 To have been more speciﬁc
would have meant losing the agreement of the negotiating States.
Although Protocol No 1 contains no direct reference to compensation for
the expropriation of property, the European Court of Human Rights has in-
terpreted it to include a kind of guarantee of compensation, albeit one which
varies depending upon the nationality of the applicant. The differing standards
of treatment are a result of the way in which the Court has interpreted Protocol
No 1’s guarantee that ‘no one’ shall be deprived of property except as subject
to ‘general principles of international law.’ In James v United Kingdom, and
again in Lithgow v United Kingdom, the Court treated the reference to ‘general
principles of international law’ in Protocol No 1 as referring to the principles
of customary international law on state responsibility, and concluded, on that
47 On the negotiating background of the European Convention’s protection of property, see
generally T Allen, Property and the Human Rights Act 1998 (Hart Publishing, Oxford, 2005).
48 See Council of Europe, Collected Edition of the ‘Travaux Preparatoires’ of the European
Convention on Human Rights: Recuil des Travaux Preparatoires de la Convention Europeene des
Droits de L’Homme (1975–85) Vol 7 194 (‘fair compensation which shall be ﬁxed in advance’);
222–24 (‘such compensation as shall be determined in accordance with the conditions provided
for by law’); 206–08 (simply ‘compensation’).
49 Protocol No1, Art. 1(1). The full text of Article 1(1) provides: ‘Every natural or legal
person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. No one shall be deprived of his
possessions except in the public interest and subject to the conditions provided for by law and by
the general principles of international law.’
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basis, that those principles were incorporated into Protocol No 1 only with
regard to those acts to which they are normally applicable, namely, acts of a
State in relation to non-nationals.50 Thus, where the applicant is a non-
national, the level of protection will be determined by international law.
However, where the applicant is a national of the expropriating State, the level
of protection will be determined under the Court’s specialized Convention
jurisprudence—international legal standards will not be applicable.
In response to the argument that this interpretation would render the refer-
ence to international law redundant—because non-nationals already were
covered by international law prior to the Convention—the Court in James and
Lithgow noted two reasons for the inclusion of the reference. First, the Court
reasoned, the reference ‘enables non-nationals to resort directly to the ma-
chinery of the Convention to enforce their rights on the basis of the relevant
principles of international law.’51 And secondly, the reference prevents any
confusion that the entry into force of the Protocol might have somehow di-
minished non-nationals’ property rights under international law.52
The Court’s conclusion that under Protocol No 1 non-nationals continue to
be protected by international law while nationals only have the Convention to
protect them, raises the question of whether such a two-tier system of pro-
tection is incompatible with Article 14 of the Convention by differentiating
between nationals and non-nationals. The Court has concluded that it is not:
Especially as regards a taking of property effected in the context of a social
reform or an economic restructuring, there may well be good grounds for
drawing a distinction between nationals and non-nationals as far as compen-
sation is concerned. To begin with, non-nationals are more vulnerable to dom-
estic legislation: unlike nationals, they will generally have played no part in the
election or designation of its authors nor have been consulted on its adoption.
Secondly, although a taking of property must always be effected in the public
interest, different considerations may apply to nationals and non-nationals and
there may well be legitimate reason for requiring nationals to bear a greater
burden in the public interest than non-nationals . . . .53
As a result of the James and Lithgow cases, it is clear that for Northern Rock
shareholders, the level of protection available to them under the Convention
very much depends upon whether they are UK nationals or not. And, as shown
below, with respect to the protection afforded under the European Convention
on Human Rights, it is better not to be British, at least with respect to
50 See James v United Kingdom (1998) Series A No 98, 8 EHRR 123, paras 60–61; Lithgow v
United Kingdom, Series A 102 (1986), 8 EHRR 329, paras 113–14. See also Gudmundsson v
Iceland (1960) Y B Eur Conv on HR 394, 422–424 (Eur Comm’n on HR).
51 James, para 62; Lithgow, para 115. 52 ibid.
53 James, para 63; Lithgow, para 116. The Court also noted that the travaux pre´paratoires of
the Protocol indicated that the reference to general principles of international law ‘was subject to
several statements to the effect that they protected only foreigners.’ James, para 64; Lithgow, para
117.
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obtaining compensation from the UK Government for nationalized shares in
Northern Rock.
2. Protection for nationals under the European Convention: The loose
requirements of proportionality and the wide margin of appreciation
For a national claimant the Convention provides limited protection in cases of
nationalization. Guided by the principle of proportionality, the Court has held
that with respect to the standard of compensation Protocol No 1 simply re-
quires that the expropriating State strike a fair balance between the demands
of the community’s general interests and the requirements of the protection of
the individual’s right to peaceful enjoyment of his property.54 Protocol No 1
‘does not . . . guarantee a right to full compensation in all circumstances, since
legitimate objectives of “public interest,” such as pursued in measures of
economic reform or measures designed to achieve greater social justice, may
call for less than reimbursement of the full market value.’55 Moreover, the
Court’s review of the compensation provided by the State in such cases is
limited ‘to ascertaining whether the choice of compensation terms falls out-
side the State’s wide margin of appreciation in this domain’.56
The Lithgow case demonstrates how the Court has applied this standard.57
There, the applicants were UK nationals (individuals and companies) whose
shares in various companies had been nationalized under the Aircraft and
Shipbuilding Industries Act 1977. All of the complaints concerned shares in
unlisted companies. The UK Government had awarded compensation for
these unlisted shares by calculating a hypothetical share price over a six-
month period set some three and a half years before the actual date of the
nationalization. The applicants argued that this method was inappropriate for
the closely held companies at issue because it undervalued their shares. In
some cases, for example, the amount of compensation did not even equal the
cash reserves of the companies. To produce a more accurate valuation, the
applicants argued, the UK Government should have utilized a valuation
methodology that would have accounted for the premium usually paid to
acquire a controlling block of shares, such as a one based upon the model of
a sale by private agreement between a willing seller and a willing buyer.
And, moreover, even if a hypothetical share price model had been used, the
54 ‘[T]here must also be a reasonable relationship of proportionality between the means em-
ployed and the aim sought to be realised . . . . Clearly, compensation terms are material to the
assessment whether a fair balance has been struck between the various interests at stake and,
notably, whether or not a disproportionate burden has been imposed on the person who has been
deprived of his possessions.’ Lithgow, para 120.
55 James, para 54. 56 ibid.
57 For a detailed analysis of Lithgow, see Maurice Mendelson, The United Kingdom
Nationalization Cases and the European Convention on Human Rights (1986) 57 Brit YB of Int’l
Law 33 (1986).
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valuation date should have been set at the time just before the nationalization,
not at a far earlier period.
The Court rejected these arguments. Relying upon the ‘wide margin of
appreciation’ available to States under the Convention, the Court stated that it
would ‘be artiﬁcial in this respect to divorce the decision as to the compen-
sation terms from the actual decision to nationalize, since the factors inﬂu-
encing the latter will of necessity also inﬂuence the former.’58 Accordingly,
it would accept ‘the legislature’s judgment in this connection unless that
judgment was manifestly without reasonable foundation’.59 Given such a
deferential standard of review, it seems that the applicants in Lithgow never
really had much of a chance. Tom Allan has rightly observed of the Court’s
decision:
[T]he combination of the relaxed view of proportionality and the wide margin of
appreciation make it apparent that the shareholders were given very little pro-
tection: in the abstract, the rules for determining compensation only had to be
‘reasonably related’ to the value of the property, and in practice, the application
of the rules could leave some owners with less than the value of their shares; and
even so, a challenge would be successful only if the rules were ‘manifestly
without reasonable foundation.’ In the end, it is difﬁcult to imagine how any set
of valuation rules could have been challenged, so long as some compensation
had been provided.60
The Court of Human Rights’ deference does not bode well for UK nationals
seeking to challenge the CSO under European standards in the Northern Rock
case.
3. Protection for non-nationals under the European Convention:
application of ‘General Principles of International Law’
Although in James and Lithgow the Court of Human Rights conﬁrmed that
non-nationals would continue to be protected by ‘general principles of inter-
national law’ under Protocol No 1, the Court did not elaborate its view on the
level of protection provided by these principles. It is clear, however, that the
Court assumed that international law provides a greater degree of protection
for non-nationals than the Convention provides for nationals. Thus, in James,
the Court observed that the reference to ‘general principles of international
law’ in Protocol No 1 ‘ensures that the position of non-nationals is
safeguarded, in that it excludes any possible argument that the entry into force
of Protocol No. 1 has led to a diminution of their rights.’61 Apart from this one
58 Lithgow, para 122. 59 ibid.
60 Allen (n 47) 182. See Mendelson, The United Kingdom Nationalization Cases, 74 (‘The
broad scope given to the Government’s ‘margin of appreciation’ apparently leaves it open for
governments to pay compensation at whatever level they feel is compatible with the social ob-
jectives of the nationalizing legislation, without much fear of condemnation from Strasbourg.’).
61 James, para 62.
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statement, however, the Court’s jurisprudence has been notably silent on the
extent of protection available under ‘general principles of international law.’62
Indeed, the Court has not addressed the application of Protocol No 1 to foreign
nationals since the Lithgow and James cases. Thus, a claim brought by foreign
Northern Rock investors under the Convention would raise an issue of ﬁrst
impression for the Court: what standard of compensation is owed under in-
ternational law for the expropriation of alien property?
a) The customary international law standard of compensation for expropriation
in the age of BITs
For many years the question of the standard of compensation for the expro-
priation of foreign investments has been one of the most debated areas of
customary international law. The main points of the debate are well known,
and there is little to be gained from a recitation here.63 Sufﬁce it to say, in
overview, that on one side of the debate have been States and academic
commentators who have taken the view that international law generally fol-
lows the Hull formula of ‘prompt, adequate and effective’ compensation.64
According to this view, as we have seen above, in order to be ‘adequate’
such compensation would require, at the least, the payment of the market
value of the property that has been expropriated. Against this view, on the
other side of the debate, have been developing States and other academics
who have argued instead for a standard of ‘appropriate compensation,’65
articulated as a ﬂexible standard that permits a State to take into account
factors such as the proﬁts made by the foreign investor, the duration of the
period during which proﬁts were made, the social purpose of the expropri-
ation, and similar factors in assessing the compensation, all of which tend
to produce valuations below market value. At the high point of the debate,
the positions of States and academics on the issue came to be seen as a
proxy in the wider struggle between socialism and capitalism, between
62 In a dissent ﬁled to the Court’s recent decision in Anheuser-Busch v Portugal, Judges
Caﬂisch and Cabral Barreto took the view that ‘general principles of international law’ includes
‘the rule requiring prompt, adequate and effective compensation.’ (2007) 45 EHRR 36, para
O–II9. The decision of the Court, however, did not reach the issue.
63 For relatively concise, and certainly contrasting, overviews of the debate, compare
Lowenfeld (n 28) Chs 13–15 and Sornorajah (n 33) Ch. 10. See generally T Wa¨lde, ‘A Requiem
for the “New Economic Order”— The Rise and Fall of Paradigms in International Economic Law
and a Post-Mortem with Timeless Signiﬁcance’ in G Hafner et al (eds), Liber Amicorum
Professor Ignaz Seidl-Hohenveldern (Kluwer Law International, Leiden, 1998) 771.
64 See, eg Third Restatement of US Foreign Relations Law, Vol 2 (1987), para 712: ‘The
Executive Branch and the Congress of the United States have held resolutely to the view that
international law requires compensation that is “prompt, adequate and effective.”’
65 See eg GA Res 1803, (XVII) ‘Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources,’ 17 UN
GAOR Supp (No 17) UN Doc A/5217 (1962); GA Res. 3281, ‘Charter of Economic Rights and
Duties of States,’ 29 UN GAOR Supp (No 31) 50, U.N. Doc. A/9631 (1974).
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capital-exporting and capital-importing States, between ‘the haves and the
have-nots.’66
The rise of BITs and regional free trade agreements like the NAFTA and the
Energy Charter Treaty has taken much of the heat out of the debate, as States
have chosen to avoid the contentious application of customary law by mem-
orializing in treaties the standard of compensation that will be applicable be-
tween them in the event of the expropriation of the property of one of their
nationals.67 Nevertheless, for treaties which refer simply to ‘international
law,’ like the European Convention on Human Rights at issue here, or Article
42 of the ICSID Convention,68 the debate about the content of international
law remains important for deﬁning the level of protection available to foreign
investors.
It is not the purpose of this article to wade too deeply into the ongoing
debate in this area. One observation which is worth making, however, is that
the consideration of customary international law today takes place against a
radically different background than the debates of the 1960s, 70s, 80s, and
even the early 1990s.69 As of 2008 there are over 2,500 BITs in force
throughout the world, most of which adopt the Hull formula or some close
variant on the issue of compensation for expropriation.70 Signiﬁcantly, this
formula has been adopted not only in BITs between capital-importing and
capital-exporting States, but also in second generation BITs between capital-
importing States—the have-nots.71 These second generation BITs are the
fastest growing category of BIT and now account for over 45 per cent of all
BITs in force.72 In these agreements—negotiated and entered into between
developing States—the parties are routinely, consistently and overwhelmingly
adopting the Hull formula or some similar market value variant as the standard
of compensation for expropriation.73 Thus, when one looks to the question of
66 Cf Amerasinghe, ‘The Quantum of Compensation for Nationalized Property’ in
R Lillich (ed) The Valuation of Nationalized Property in International Law (1975) Vol III ch IV.
67 See generally E Lauterpacht, ‘Issues of Compensation and Nationality in the Taking of
Energy Investments’ (1990) 6 J of Energy & Nat’L Resources Law 241 (1990).
68 Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals of
Other States, Art 42, ICSID Basic Documents (Jan 1985).
69 See Stephen Schwebel, ‘The Reshaping of the International Law on Foreign Investment by
Concordant Bilateral Investment Treaties’ in Steven Charnovitz, et al (eds), Law in the Service of
Human Dignity: Essays in Honour of Florentino Feliciano (2005) 241.
70 UNCTAD, World Investment Report (2007) 16–19.
71 UNCTAD, International Investment Agreements: Key Issues, Vol I (2004) 244; UNCTAD,
Bilateral Investment Treaties 1995–2006: Trends In Investment Rulemaking (2007).
72 UNCTAD, World Investment Report (2003) 89.
73 For a few examples, see Africa: Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa
(COMESA) Treaty (1994), Art 159(3) (‘adequate compensation’); South Africa–Madagascar BIT
(2006), Art 6 (‘adequat et effectif’); Botswana-Egypt BIT (2003), Art 6 (‘prompt, adequate and
effective’); Cameroon–Guinea BIT (2001), Art 6 (‘effective et ade´quate’); Eritrea–Uganda BIT
(2001) Art 4 (‘prompt, adequate and effective’); Ethiopia-Sudan BIT (2000), Art 4 (‘prompt,
adequate and effective’); Mauritius-Burundi BIT (2001), Art 7 (‘effective et ade´quate’); Asia:
ASEAN Agreement for the Promotion and Protection of Investments (1987), Art VI (‘adequate
compensation’); Democratic People’s Republic of Korea–Thailand BIT (2002), Art 6 (‘prompt,
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whether the standard of compensation adopted across this great mass of BITs
might be said to have come to represent customary international law, it is no
longer possible to discount that development on the ground of unequal bar-
gaining power between capital-exporting and capital-importing States.74
The principle that treaty-based rules may ‘become generalized through the
conclusion of other similar conventions containing identical or similar pro-
visions’75 is well recognized in international law. The question that arises with
respect to the standard of compensation for expropriation is whether the
conclusion of so many BITs carries with it the opinio juris classically
necessary for a customary rule to emerge.76 As early as 1981, when BITs were
still in their relative nascence, and still almost exclusively between developed
States and developing States, Mann argued that ‘[w]here these treaties express
a duty which customary international law imposes or is widely believed to
impose, they give very strong support to the existence of such a duty and
preclude the Contracting States from denying its existence . . .’77 While Mann
was perhaps premature with his assessment of the law at the time, it does not
seem as though he would be today. Twenty-ﬁve years on and we ﬁnd over
2,500 BITs in force between States of all levels of development, all types of
political orientation and covering all geographic regions. And across these
agreements we ﬁnd that States have adopted overwhelmingly the Hull formula
adequate and effective’); Bangladesh–Philippines BIT (1997) Art IV (‘just compensation’
amounting to market value); Azerbaijan–Pakistan BIT (1995), Art 3 (‘prompt, adequate and
effective’); Kyrgystan-Pakistan BIT (1995), Art 4 (‘prompt, adequate and effective’); Vietnam–
Thailand BIT (1991), Art 6 (‘adequate’ and ‘effective[ ]’); Central and South America:
Dominican Republic–Central American Free Trade Area (DR-CAFTA) Treaty (2005), Art 10.7
(‘prompt, adequate and effective’); Colonia Protocol on the Reciprocal Promotion and Protection
of Investments within Mercosur (1994), Art 4 (‘previa, adecuada y efectiva’); Costa Rica–
Paraguay BIT (1998), Art 7 (‘adecuada, pronta y efectiva’); Dominican Republic-Ecuador BIT
(1998), Art 4 (‘pronta, adecuada y efectiva’); Panama–Argentina BIT (2004), Art 3 (‘pronta,
adecuada y efectiva’); Honduras–Chile BIT (1996), Art VI (‘inmediata, adecuada y efectiva’);
Nicaragua-Chile BIT (1996), Art 6 (‘inmediata, adecuada y efectiva’); Bolivia–Ecuador BIT
(1995), Art VI; Colombia–Peru BIT (1994), Art 7 (‘pronta, adecuada y efectiva’); Middle East
and Europe: Yemen–Indonesia BIT (1998), Art IV (‘prompt, adequate and effective’); Egypt–
Albania BIT (1993), Art 4(2) (‘prompt, adequate and effective’); Jordan–Algeria BIT (1996), Art
5 (‘appropriate and actual compensation’ equal to market value); Ukraine–Indonesia BIT (1996),
Art. IV (‘prompt, adequate and effective’); Armenia-Lebanon BIT (1994), Art 5 (‘adequate and
effective’). Recent Chinese BITs, although not using the Hull formula as such, nevertheless
require the payment of compensation which will place the investor ‘in the same ﬁnancial position
as that in which they would have been if the measures . . . had not been taken.’ Compare, eg
China-Argentina BIT (1994), Art 4 with UK–China (1986), Art 5 (‘reasonable compensation’
amounting to the ‘real value’ of the investment).
74 See Sornorajah (n 33) 241–45.
75 Report of the International Law Commission Covering the Work of Its 12th Session, (1960)
YB of Int’l Law Comm’n 145 UN Doc A/4425.
76 North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (Federal Republic of Germany v Denmark) (Federal
Republic of Germany v Netherlands) (1969) ICJ Rep 3 para 71.
77 FA Mann, ‘British Treaties for the Promotion and Protection of Investments’ (1981) Brit
YB Int’l L 241, 249.
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or some similar market value variant as the standard of compensation in cases
of expropriation.
To paraphrase Mann, can it really be said that the adoption of a similar
standard in such a large number of BITs involving States across the spectrum
ought not give indication of what we think the customary international law on
the subject is? One would think not.78 Particularly when set against the
background of the active and contentious debate on the customary law stan-
dard which dominated much of the 20th century, it is hard to treat the volte-
face of so many developing States in BITs as merely lex specialis. Instead, it
seems much more reasonable to conclude that the trend represented by BITs
and other investment agreements which have adopted the Hull formula or
some variant indicates coalescence by States on a particular standard of
treatment. Indeed, it would seem that the lex specialis here is to be found in
those few BITs in which the States have chosen to depart from the Hull for-
mula or a market value variant. This does not mean that customary inter-
national law is becoming ﬁxed for all time, or that every BIT provision has
come to represent customary international law, but it does reﬂect what appears
to be a global consensus which has not previously existed in the customary
international law debate on the standard of compensation for expropriation.
The decisions of the tribunals charged with interpreting and applying these
BITs have come to the same conclusion: BIT provisions on the standard of
protection in cases of expropriation reﬂect customary international law.79
Thus, in the CME Czech Republic award, for example, the tribunal concluded
that the Hull formula had become ‘truly universal’ as a consequence of the
essential agreement on the standard found in (what was then) some 2,200 BITs
and similar multilateral investment treaties.80 Other tribunals have come to the
same conclusion.81 It is fair to say, therefore, that for purposes of the European
78 For a contrary view, see Guzman, ‘Why LDCs Sign Treaties That Hurt Them: Explaining
the Popularity of Bilateral Investment Treaties’ (1998) 38 Va J Int’l L 639, 685–86 (‘the repetition
of common clauses in bilateral treaties does not create or support an inference that those clauses
express customary law . . . To sustain such a claim of custom one would have to show that apart
from the treaty itself, the rules in the clauses are considered obligatory’). Sornarajah at least
acknowledges that it is ‘possible that if there is concordance of standards in [BITs], such standards
on which there is consistent agreement evidenced by such treaties could become international
law’, but concludes that this has not happened. Sornojah (n 33) 226–27.
79 As a result of the background of active debate and controversy as to the position of the Hull
formula in customary international prior to the widespread adoption of the standard in BITs, it is
quite possible that expropriation and the standard of compensation for it are unique examples.
Other commentators, however, and some arbitral tribunals, have taken a broader view of the kinds
of BIT protections which are also said to now represent customary law. See, egMondev Int’l Ltd v
United States, ICSID Case No ARB(AF) 99/2, Award (11 Oct 2002) para 117 (concluding that the
‘fair and equitable treatment’ standard has attained a customary character). See also A Lowenfeld,
‘Investment Agreements and International Law’ (2003) 42 Colum J Transnat’l L 123. The author
takes no position in this article on such an expansive interpretation of the effect of BITs on
customary international law. 80 CME Czech Republic (no 44) para 497.
81 See Biloune and Marine Drive Complex Ltd v Ghana Investments Centre and the
Government of Ghana, Award on Jurisdiction and Liability (27 Oct 1989) 95 ILR 183, 211.
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Convention on Human Rights, the Hull standard reﬂects the ‘general princi-
ples of international law’ which the Court would and ought to apply.
B. The UK and European View on the Customary Standard
Beyond the arguments on the current state of customary international law, it is
hard to imagine that, in an actual case before the European Court of Human
Rights, the United Kingdom would take a different view on the protection
available to a foreign investor under ‘general principles of international law.’
The United Kingdom’s position on the customary international law standard
for compensation in cases of the expropriation of alien property has been the
same for more than ﬁfty years and is not in any doubt. As a major exporter of
investment capital, the United Kingdom has consistently taken the view that in
order for an expropriation to be lawful it must be made against prompt, ad-
equate and effective compensation. Thus, in the Anglo-Iranian Oil Case, for
example, the British pleadings before the International Court of Justice took
the view that ‘it is clear that the nationalization of the property of foreigners,
even if not unlawful on any other ground, becomes an unlawful conﬁscation
unless provision is made for compensation which is adequate, prompt and
effective.’82 Similarly, in the BP arbitration, the British protest to the
Government of Libya took the position that ‘[a]n act of nationalization is not
legitimate unless . . . it [is] followed by the payment of prompt, adequate and
effective compensation.’83 Indeed, even in the Lithgow case, where such a
standard might well have worked against the United Kingdom (had the Court
interpreted Protocol No 1 differently), the United Kingdom maintained its
position that customary international law requires the payment of compen-
sation in accordance with the Hull formula.84 While such declarations may not
be dispositive with respect to the standard applicable under the ‘general
principles of international law’ provision of Protocol No 1,85 it is hardly im-
aginable that the UK Government would take a different position if this issue
were to arise before the European Court of Human Rights in the context of the
Northern Rock nationalization.
Moreover, the United Kingdom is not alone among parties to the European
Convention on Human Rights in taking the view that customary international
law requires ‘prompt, adequate and effective’ compensation for expropriation.
While it is difﬁcult to be comprehensive because of the vagaries involved in
identifying individual states’ positions the view taken by commentators on
82 Anglo-Iranian Oil Case (1952) ICJ Pleadings 105–106.
83 (1974) 53 ILR 297, 317. United Kingdom v Iran.
84 Applications Nos 9006/80, 9006/80, 9262/81, 9263/81, 9265/81, 9266/81, 9313/81 and
9405/81, Sir William Lithgow v United Kingdom (1984) Report of the European Commission of
Human Rights, para 254.
85 Cf Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua
(Nicaragua v United States) (Merits) [1986] ICJ Rep 14, para 184.
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Protocol No 1 is that ‘the States signing up to the Protocol in 1950 would have
said that right of protest arises where an alien’s property is taken without
prompt, adequate and effective compensation.’86 By way of illustration, the
example of Portugal’s accession to the European Convention on Human
Rights in 1978 may be given. In that situation, Portugal decided to submit a
reservation to Protocol No 1 upon its ratiﬁcation, the purpose of which was to
reserve to Portugal the right to make expropriations without compensation.87
In response, France, Germany and the United Kingdom took the unusual step
of making declarations which afﬁrmed that regardless of Portugal’s reser-
vation, general principles of international law as referenced in Protocol No 1
required the payment of prompt, adequate and effective compensation with
respect to the expropriation of foreign property.88 The Portuguese might do as
they wished with respect to their own nationals, but as to foreign nationals the
‘general principles of international law’ applied and could not be varied by the
reservation.
In summary, then, under international law the standard of protection owed
to investors in Northern Rock is relatively straightforward. For non-UK
nationals, the standard of protection is to be set either by the provisions of an
applicable BIT which the United Kingdom has entered into with the investor’s
home state or by the customary international law standard as incorporated into
Protocol No 1 of the European Convention on Human Rights. These standards
require the payment of market value compensation and apply as a trump to the
treatment set out in the CSO, notwithstanding Lord Davies’ comments in the
House of Lords. For UK investors, however, the situation is very different.
There is no signiﬁcant international check on the CSO’s provisions. Apart
from the very modest review available under European human rights law, UK
investors are likely to be left to the mercies of the process set forth under the
CSO and such protections as may be available under UK administrative law.89
III. APPLYING THE INTERNATIONAL STANDARD OF COMPENSATION—THE QUANTUM OF
MARKET VALUE
It is not enough to look at the standard of compensation provided by inter-
national law. The payment of compensation requires that a quantum be cal-
culated.90 A ﬁgure must be reached that a court or tribunal can apply. In order
86 See Allen (n 47) 167–68.
87 (1978) 21 YB Eur Conv on HR 16 (cited in HR Fabri, ‘The Approach Taken by the
European Court of Human Rights to the Assessment of Compensation for ‘Regulatory Expro-
priations’ of the Property of Foreign Investors’ (2002) 11 NYU Envir LJ N148, 162–63).
88 (1979) 22 YB Eur Conv on HR 16–22. In the event, Portugal withdrew its reservation in
1987 without comment.
89 Whether there may be remedies available to Northern Rock investors under UK adminis-
trative law is beyond the scope of this paper.
90 Since BITs generally recognize the permissibility of expropriation in the public interest
against payment of prompt, adequate and effective compensation, the question of restitution does
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to have operational meaning, a qualitative standard like ‘adequate’ compen-
sation must be paired with a valuation methodology capable of producing a
quantum.91 Even where the value to be calculated is articulated in terms
closely associated with a quantitative determination, such as the ‘market
value’ standard applicable in the UK BITs and customary international law,
there still may be a number of possible bases on which a valuer may make a
valuation due to the nature of the property being valued.92 Investment treaties
only infrequently refer to speciﬁc methodologies for the determination of
value.93 The UK BITs are not among those that do.
The selection of a compensation methodology requires in the ﬁrst place a
determination of the property or investment which is to be valued. In the case
of Northern Rock, nationalization has been effected through the transfer to the
State of all of the shares of Northern Rock. Instead of nationalizing the com-
pany itself and taking its assets after dissolution, the United Kingdom has
taken the shares of the company and claims that the legal existence of the
company has not been the subject of any modiﬁcation. Only the ownership of
the company has changed. In such a situation, it is the shares of Northern Rock
that must be valued.94
A. The Valuation Assumptions of the CSO and Their Likely Effect on the
Quantum of Compensation—The Valuation Date Problem
Under international law, the value of expropriated property is to be deter-
mined by looking at the value of the property as of or just immediately before
the date on which the expropriation occurred or the decision to expropriate
became publicly known95 without reference to the effects of the expropriation
itself or any acts related to that expropriation.96 The signiﬁcance of estab-
lishing the market value of expropriated property ‘as of’ (or just before) the
date of the act of expropriation lies in its bearing on the factors that may
not often arise. See C Schreuer, ‘Non-Pecuniary Remedies in ICSID Arbitration’ (2004) 20 Arb
Int’l L 325.
91 T Stauffer, ‘Valuation of Assets in International Takings’ (1996) 17 Energy LJ 459, 459.
92 See A Hicks & A Gregory, ‘Valuation of Shares: A Legal and Accounting Conundrum’
(1995) J Bus L 56, 67–68.
93 See North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), Art 1110(2)–(6): ‘Valuation criteria
shall include going concern value, asset value, including declared tax value of tangible property,
and other criteria, as appropriate, to determine fair market value.’
94 See M Mendelson, ‘International Law and the Valuation of Nationalized Shares: Two
French Decisions’ (1985) 34 ICLQ 284, 284.
95 This is true both as a matter of customary international law and treaty practice. See, eg UK–
Singapore BIT, TS No 51 (1975), Art 5(1); UK-United Arab Emirates BIT, TS No 24 (1994), Art
6(1); World Bank Guidelines Art IV 3.
96 See Saghi v Islamic Republic of Iran Award No 544-298-2, 29 Iran-U.S.C.T.R. 20 (1993),
para 79; Starrett Housing Corp v Islamic Republic of Iran, Award No 314-24-1, 16 Iran–
U.S.C.T.R. 112, 202 (1987).
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properly be taken into account in assessing the market value of the property.
Factors which relate to the act of expropriation ought not to be considered.
Ordinarily, the governmental action which the valuation-date rule seeks to
exclude is governmental action taken before the expropriation has actually
occurred. In a situation like the one arising under the CSO, however, there is
reason to think that the valuation-date rule should also apply to exclude the
blighting effects of governmental action taken after the expropriation. While it
is strange to think of governmental action taken after the expropriation as
having a retroactive effect on the market value of an investment at the effec-
tive date of the expropriation that is precisely what the CSO seeks to do. Even
though section 3 of the CSO states that ‘the amount of any compensation
payable’ to Northern Rock shareholders ‘shall be an amount equal to the value
immediately before’ the expropriation occurred,97 other provisions of the CSO
make clear that this value ‘must’ reﬂect four key assumptions mandated by the
CSO itself, ie after the expropriation occurred. These are that:
(a) Northern Rock is unable to continue as a going concern;98
(b) Northern Rock is in administration;99
(c) All ﬁnancial assistance provided to Northern Rock by the Bank of
England or the Treasury has been withdrawn;100 and
(d) No ﬁnancial assistance would be provided to Northern Rock by the Bank
of England or Treasury in the future (except for such ordinary assistance
offered by the Bank of England).101
The inclusion of these mandatory ‘assumptions’ in the CSO is fairly remark-
able. Notwithstanding the ﬁnancial difﬁculties experienced by Northern Rock
in late 2007/early 2008, there is considerable evidence in the public record
indicating that at the time immediately prior to the nationalization—ie the
valuation date required by international law and the UK BITs—none of the
‘assumptions’ required by the CSO was true. Northern Rock in fact was not in
administration. By the Government’s own account, Northern Rock was sol-
vent and a going concern.102 Financial assistance from the Treasury and the
Bank of England had not been withdrawn.103 And there was no suggestion one
97 CSO, s 3(2). 98 CSO, s 6(a). 99 ibid s 6(b).
100 Banking (Special Provisions) Act 2008, s 5(4)(a), as incorporated by CSO, s 6.
101 ibid s 5(4)(b).
102 See Testimony of Alistair Darling, Chancellor of the Exchequer, before House of
Commons Treasury Committee, 18 Dec 2007, at Q 1710; HC Deb, 19 Nov 2007, col 960 (Alistair
Darling); Testimony of Alistair Darling, Chancellor of the Exchequer, before House of Commons
Treasury Committee, 25 Oct 2007, at Q 848; Bank of England, News Release, Liquidity Support
Facility for Northern Rock plc (14 Sep 2007).
103 Northern Rock originally entered into a support facility with the Bank of England on or
about 14 September 2007. See Bank of England, News Release, Liquidity Support Facility for
Northern Rock plc (14 Sep 2007). On 9 October, the Bank of England announced that ‘additional
facilities’ would be available to Northern Rock through the Bank of England with support of the
UK Treasury. See Bank of England, News Release, Northern Rock plc deposits (9 Oct 2007);
Northern Rock plc, Annual Report and Accounts 2007, 42. No details of the amount borrowed
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way or the other how the Treasury or the Bank of England would act in the
future with respect to further ﬁnancial assistance to Northern Rock. In es-
sence, the CSO requires a rewriting of history. As a result, it is difﬁcult to see
how a valuation based upon the CSO assumptions can be characterized as
independent of the effects of the UK’s expropriating measures. To the con-
trary, the valuation ‘methodology’ mandated by the CSO seems to require a
lack of independence by the Government-appointed valuer and render im-
possible a valuation free from the effects of the expropriating measure.104
B. The Generally Accepted Manner of Determining the Market Value of
Shares in a Publicly Traded Company—The ‘Market Value’ Problem
It seems apparent that the assumptions imposed by the CSO will not produce a
market valuation of the Northern Rock shares. Under the CSO assumptions
the likely result is that shareholders will receive no more than liquidation
value for their shares. The term ‘going concern’ has an established meaning
for accountants and valuation experts, and where a business is not classiﬁed as
a going concern, liquidation value is generally the methodology employed.105
Liquidation value refers to ‘the amounts at which individual assets comprising
the enterprise or the entire assets of the enterprise could be sold under con-
ditions of liquidation to a willing buyer less any liabilities which the enterprise
has to meet.’106 While it is not possible in this article to measure with pre-
cision the quantum of compensation which application of the CSO method-
ology will produce—the information necessary for such an exercise is not in
the public record—it is widely expected that the quantum produced by a
liquidation value methodology will fall far short of the 90p market price at
under these facilities (or their essential terms) have been made public. See HC Deb, 19 November
2007, col. 960 (Alistair Darling, Chancellor of the Exchequer) (declining to provide information
to the House). Nevertheless, Northern Rock itself reported that by the end of 2007 the total
amount borrowed was £26.9 billion, Northern Rock plc, Annual Report and Accounts 2007, 31,
and it may be assumed that the total amount borrowed by the time of the nationalization in
February 2008 was substantially higher. Notably, even with these high levels of borrowing,
throughout the time prior to the nationalization the UK Government repeatedly conﬁrmed its
belief that Northern Rock was solvent and a going concern. See (n 102).
104 It might be argued that the assumptions mandated by the CSO and the Banking (Special
Provisions) Act do no more than require that any valuation reﬂect the ﬁnancial circumstances in
which Northern Rock found itself at the time of the nationalization. As such, the argument might
go, the nationalization, although technically an expropriation, actually caused no loss or damage
to the investors. See Biwater Gauff (Tanzania) Ltd (UK) v United Republic of Tanzania, ICSID
ARB/05/22, Award (24 July 2008), para 803. This seems to miss the point. The valuation issue in
the cases of Northern Rock and Bradford & Bingley is the market value of the shares of those
companies. As discussed below, whatever the ﬁnancial circumstances faced by those companies
at the time of their nationalizations—the relevant date for valuation purposes—the shares had a
real market value as determined on the London Stock Exchange.
105 See M Kantor, Valuation for Arbitration: Compensation Standards, Valuation Methods
and Expert Evidence (2008) 91–92.
106 World Bank, Guidelines for the Treatment of Foreign Direct Investment, Art IV.
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which those shares were trading on the London Stock Exchange immediately
before the expropriation became public knowledge. Indeed, Northern Rock
shareholders believe that the value produced by the CSO methodology will be
nil or nearly so.107
While the UK Government may legally have the discretion to pay liqui-
dation value to investors of UK nationality,108 with regard to non-UK in-
vestors the United Kingdom must meet the market value standard set by
international law and its BIT obligations. In a case such as this—almost by
deﬁnition—liquidation value is unlikely to equate to market value.
1. The market valuation of shares in publicly traded companies
As a general rule, the market value of a share in a company, like the market
value of most things, comes down to what a willing buyer would pay a willing
seller.109 Where there is no public market for shares, ie where the company is
closely held, ascertaining a market value can be exceptionally challenging.110
In essence, as Lord Ashbourne observed, a feat of imagination is necessary:111
a hypothetical market value of the shares must be created. In such cases, the
choice of methodology and its application can be both complex and conten-
tious.112
Where, however, shares are quoted on an active public exchange, such as
the London Stock Exchange, the best indicator of the market value of those
shares is the price at which they are trading in the actual market.113 It is not
necessary to construct a hypothetical share price because there is a real share
price in the market. Current market prices reﬂect the market’s assessment of
the underlying present value of the future proﬁts of quoted shares.114 As one
107 See W Lawson, Chairman, Northern Rock Shareholders Action Group, A Note on the
Northern Rock Legal Action by Shareholders (13 June 2008) 7, available at http://www.
uksa.org.uk/NRK_Legal_Case.pdf.
108 See (n 58–60) and accompanying text.
109 See Nigel Eastaway, Harry Booth & Keith Eamer, Practical Share Valuation (4th edn,
1998) 10.
110 ibid, 245. 111 A-G (Ireland) v Jameson [1905] 2 IR 218, 226.
112 In deriving a market value for shares for which there is no public market, there are three
basic methods of valuation to which ﬁnancial experts generally turn: net asset value; discounted
cash ﬂow; and price-earnings multiples. See R Pike & B Neale, Corporate Finance and
Investment (5th edn, 2006) 89. Dividend valuation is noted by Ferran as a fourth method of
valuation. See E Ferran, Company Law and Corporate Finance (1999) 54. There has been on-
going discussion in the legal literature about which of these methods is the most appropriate when
determining the compensation due for an expropriation. For a concise overview of the discussion,
see Irmgard Marboe, ‘Compensation and Damages in International Law: The Limits of ‘Fair
Market Value’ 7 J World Trade & Invest 723, 730 (2006).
113 N Eastaway, H Booth & K Eamer, Practical Share Valuation (4th edn, 1998) 245. See
Southern Paciﬁc Properties (Middle East) Ltd v Egypt, ICSID Case No ARB/84/3, Award
(20 May 1992), para 197 (contrasting market prices in an efﬁcient capital market with a situation
in which the number of transactions is limited and there is no public market).
114 See, eg T Koller, M Goedhart & D Wessels, Valuation: Measuring and Managing the
Value of Companies (4th edn, 2005) 70; R Brealey, S Myers & F Allen, Principles of Corporate
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tribunal has noted, where share prices are quoted on a public market, the
valuation process ‘can be a fairly easy one,’ since the price of the shares is
determined under conditions which, a fortiori, meet the deﬁnition of ‘market
value.’115 Simply put, ‘[i]nternational jurisprudence supports ﬁnding fair
market value by reference to a share trading price when available.’116
The conclusion that the market price of a share reﬂects its value is based
upon the principle of capital market efﬁciency, which posits that market prices
reﬂect the value of shares because an active public stock exchange with low
transaction costs is able to respond quickly to available information, including
temporary and artiﬁcial factors, in reaching a share price.117 ‘So long as the
market is reasonably efﬁcient, the market price can be trusted as a fair as-
sessment of value.’118 Valuation experts suggest, however, that where the
shares under consideration represent a controlling interest in a company, a
‘control premium’ of some amount above market price should be added to
reﬂect the fact that ownership of a controlling number of shares brings with it
rights that minority share owners do not possess, such as the right to appoint
the managers of the company.119 The justiﬁcation for this view is based upon
economic studies of control transactions in the market, which provide evi-
dence that control premiums are ordinarily paid by purchasers of controlling
quantities of shares.120 Adding a control premium above the quoted market
price for valuation purposes reﬂects the fact that the quoted price of a share on
a public exchange is the product of numerous minority transactions, not
transactions involving the trading of controlling interests in the company.
Accordingly, the market price serves as a base onto which the premium should
be added in cases in which a control premium is appropriate.121
Finance (2006). See also T Stauffer, ‘Valuation of Assets in International Takings,’ 17 Energy LJ
459, 472 (1996) (‘[T]he market value, where there is a transaction, was most probably determined
as the result of discounted cash ﬂow valuations undertaken both by buyer and seller. This is true
for acquisitions and mergers, it true for project investments and is also generally true in the case of
stock market valuation of listed companies.’).
115 CMS Gas Transmission Co v Argentina, ICSID Case No ARB/01/8, Award (12 May 2005),
para 403.
116 Reineccius v Bank of International Settlements, Partial Award (Permanent Court of Arb.
2002), para 163. See Khosrowshahi v Islamic Republic of Iran, Award No. 558-178-2, 30 Iran-
U.S.C.T.R. 76, 92 (1994). Accord ACSYNGO v. Compagnie de Saint-Gobain (France) SA, 82
ILR 127, 137 (Belgium Comm. Ct. 1986) (case arising out of the French bank nationalizations).
117 See H Houthakker & P Williamson, The Economics of Financial Markets (1996) 130;
T Koller, M Goedhart & D Wessels, Valuation: Measuring and Managing the Value of Com-
panies (4th edn, 2005) Ch. 4; J van Horne, Financial Market Rates & Flows (1994).
118 R Pike & B Neale, Corporate Finance and Investment (5th edn, 2006) 89.
119 See S P Pratt, Business Valuation: Discounts and Premiums (2001) 18. See generally B
Black, ‘Bidder Overpayment in Takeovers’, 41 Stan L Rev 597 (1989); Lawrence A Hamermesh,
‘Premiums in Stock-for-Stock Mergers and Some Consequences in the Law of Director Fiduciary
Duties’, 152 U Pa L Rev 881 (2003).
120 See M Jensen & R Ruback, ‘The Market for Corporate Control: The Scientiﬁc Evidence,’
11 J Fin Econ 5 (1983).
121 S P Pratt, Business Valuation: Discounts and Premiums (2001) 5–9.
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The use of control premiums has been acknowledged in the corporate law
of numerous jurisdictions. To date, however, it has not featured prominently in
the valuation decisions of international arbitral tribunals. In part this may be
because control premiums are most appropriately applied in cases in which the
shares being valued are publicly122 traded and most cases of expropriation
have not involved publicly traded shares. Where, however, as in the Northern
Rock situation, or the Bradford & Bingley situation discussed below, the ex-
propriated investment consists of publicly traded shares, the principles of
valuation would indicate that a control premium ought to apply when evalu-
ating the adequacy of the State’s compensation. Had the State wished to pur-
chase a controlling block (or all) of these shares in the market, such a premium
would likely have been required. Accordingly, if the standard of compensation
to be paid is meant to be the ‘market value’ of the investment, then it should
represent not only the share price at the relevant time, but also the relevant
premium.
IV. THE NATIONALIZATION OF BRADFORD & BINGLEY: QUESTIONS AT THE OUTSET
Like Northern Rock, Bradford & Bingley plc was a publicly held bank, whose
shares were traded on the London Stock Exchange.123 Like Northern Rock as
well, Bradford & Bingley confronted a worsening ﬁnancial position as a result
of tightening in the global credit markets in 2007 into 2008.124 When global
credit markets froze in September 2008, Bradford & Bingley faced unpre-
cedented margin and liquidity pressure, and on Saturday 27 September 2008,
the UK Financial Services Authority (FSA) determined that the company no
longer met its threshold conditions for operating as a deposit taker under the
Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 and FSA rules.125 Thereafter, on
Monday 29 September 2008, the UK Treasury brought forward an order
nationalizing all shares in Bradford & Bingley and selling certain Bradford
& Bingley assets to Abbey National plc, a subsidiary of Banco Santander
SA (the ‘Bradford & Bingley Transfer Order’).126 Like the Northern Rock
122 The standard valuation technique for non-publicly traded companies is discounted cash
ﬂow analysis (DCF). Pratt observes that because DCF analysis ‘should represent the full value of
the future cash ﬂows of the business, excluding synergies, a company cannot be worth a premium
over the value of its future cash ﬂows. Thus, it is improper and illogical to add a control premium
to a DCF valuation.’ See S P Pratt, The Lawyer’s Business Valuation Handbook (2000) 359.
123 On 2 January 2008, Bradford & Bingley shares closed at £2.79. On 26 September 2008, the
last day on which Bradford & Bingley shares were traded, the closing price was 20p per share.
124 See Bradford & Bingley plc, Interim Management Statement (22 Apr 2008); ibid, Interim
Financial Report (29 August 2008). See also P Trowbridge & B Livesey, Bradford & Bingley
Is Seized; Santander Buys Branches, Bloomberg.com (29 Sept 2008), available at http://
www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=ajIkm9fWTtRI
125 Financial Services Authority, News Release, Bradford & Bingley plc (29 Sept 2008).
126 The Bradford & Bingley plc Transfer of Securities and Property etc Order 2008, SI 2546/
2008.
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nationalization, the authority for the Bradford & Bingley nationalization was
the Banking (Special Provisions) Act 2008.
In material respects, the Bradford & Bingley Transfer Order tracks the
provisions of the Northern Rock Transfer Order. As of this writing, however,
the terms of compensation for Bradford & Bingley’s shareholders are un-
known. The Treasury has not yet brought forth an order establishing a
compensation scheme for Bradford & Bingley shareholders, although it has
said that it will do so in due course.127 It remains to be seen, therefore, whether
the compensation scheme for Bradford & Bingley shareholders will raise the
same issues as the Northern Rock scheme.
Even so, one difference between the Bradford & Bingley and the Northern
Rock transfer orders is worth noting preliminarily, and that is the emphasis in
the Bradford & Bingley Transfer Order on the circumstances under which the
nationalization has taken place. Whereas the Northern Rock Transfer Order
contains perambulatory language indicating that the purpose of the Order was
to ‘protect the public interest’ in circumstances in which the UK Treasury had
provided ﬁnancial assistance to Northern Rock, the preamble to the Bradford
& Bingley Transfer Order indicates that the purpose of the Order was to
‘maintain[ ] the stability of the UK ﬁnancial system in circumstances where
the Treasury consider that there would be a serious threat to its stability if the
Order were not made.’ This different seems signiﬁcant. The latter phrasing is
evocative of the doctrine of necessity, and suggests that on the UK Treasury’s
view the nationalization of Bradford & Bingley was a necessary action taken
in order to prevent a serious threat to the UK economy from materializing. As
a consequence, it is conceivable that the United Kingdom could seek to rely on
necessity to justify the payment of no compensation to Bradford & Bingley
shareholders or compensation which is less than market value.
A. The Doctrine of ‘Necessity’ in International Law
Under customary international law as reﬂected in Article 25 of the Inter-
national Law Commission’s (ILC) Articles on State Responsibility, necessity
may be relied upon by a State as a ground to derogate from its international
obligations in circumstances in which to do so would otherwise be wrongful.
In order to establish a defence of necessity, however, the State must meet a
number of stringent criteria:
(a) the act or measure sought to be justiﬁed must have been occasioned by a
threat to an ‘essential interest’ of the State;
(b) the measure taken must have been ‘the only means’ of safeguarding that
interest;
127 UK Treasury, News Release 97/08, Bradford & Bingley plc (29 Sept 2008), para 16.
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(c) the measure must not have seriously impaired an essential interest of the
State towards which the obligation existed; and
(d) the State seeking to rely upon the defense must not have ‘contributed to
the occurrence of the state of necessity.’
These criteria are cumulative;128 all must be satisﬁed in order for the defence
to be established.
The ILC’s elaboration of the doctrine of necessity suggests the limited
circumstances in which the doctrine is available and the high degree of proof
required to make out the defence. Arbitral tribunals deciding claims brought
under BITs containing speciﬁc treaty language dealing with circumstances of
necessity have conﬁrmed that the doctrine is ‘an exceptional remedy subject to
very strict conditions because otherwise it would open the door to elude any
international obligation.’129 A review of those decisions suggests some of the
difﬁculties which may be faced by the United Kingdom.
1. The Argentina ﬁnancial crisis cases
The ﬁnancial crisis experienced in Argentina in the late 1990s and early
2000s prompted a large number of claims against Argentina under various
BITs. In a number of those claims, Argentina argued that the measures it
had taken, particularly Emergency Law 25,561 of January 2002, had been
necessary in light of the ﬁnancial turmoil being experience by the country.
At the time the Emergency Law was adopted, the unemployment rate in
Argentina exceeded 20 per cent and millions of people were in poverty.130
There were large scale instances of public disorder occurring throughout
the country.131 By some measures, the Argentine state itself was under
threat.132
Yet despite the gravity of the situation in which Argentina clearly found
itself, two of three ICSID tribunals which heard Argentina’s claim of necessity
rejected it. In CMS v Argentina, for example, the tribunal concluded that while
an economic crisis could certainly implicate the essential interests of the State,
the State was still required to show that the measures adopted constituted the
‘only way’ for the State to protect that interest:
[T]he Tribunal is persuaded that the situation was difﬁcult enough to justify the
government taking action to prevent a worsening of the situation and the danger
of total economic collapse . . . . A different issue, however, is whether the mea-
sures adopted were the ‘only way’ for the State to safeguard its interests. This
is indeed debatable . . . . The International Law Commission’s comment to the
128 Gabcˇı´kovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary v Slovakia) [1997] ICJ Rep 7, paras 51–52.
129 Enron v Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/3, Award (22 May 2007), para 304.
130 See LG&E Energy Corp v Argentina, ICSID Case No ARB/02/1, Decision on Liability
(3 Oct 2006), para 234.
131 ibid, para 235. 132 ibid, para. 231.
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effect that the plea of necessity is ‘excluded if there are other (otherwise lawful)
means available, even if they may be more costly or less convenient,’ is per-
suasive in assisting this Tribunal in concluding that the measures adopted were
not the only steps available . . . .133
Moreover, even if Argentina had been able to show that the measures it
adopted were the ‘only way’ to safeguard its essential interests, it still would
have been necessary to show that Argentina had not substantially contributed
to the situation of necessity. As the CMS tribunal again observed:
In spite of the view of the parties claiming that all factors contributing to the
crisis were either endogenous or exogenous, the Tribunal is again persuaded that
similar to what is the case in most crises of this kind the roots extend both ways
and include a number of domestic as well as international dimensions. This is the
unavoidable consequence of the operation of a global economy where domestic
and international factors interact.
The issue, however, is whether the contribution to the crisis by Argentina has
or has not been sufﬁciently substantial. The Tribunal, when reviewing the circum-
stances of the present dispute, must conclude that this was the case. The crisis
was not of the making of one particular administration and found its roots in the
earlier crisis of the 1980s and evolving governmental policies of the 1990s that
reached a zenith in 2002 and thereafter. Therefore, the Tribunal observes that
government policies and their shortcomings signiﬁcantly contributed to the crisis
and the emergency and while exogenous factors did fuel additional difﬁculties
they do not exempt the Respondent from its responsibility in the matter.134
The rejection of Argentina’s necessity plea suggests how difﬁcult it may be
for the United Kingdom to establish the plea in the situation under consider-
ation here.
For the United Kingdom, the argument must be that while the CMS
and Enron tribunals correctly identiﬁed the required elements of the necessity
defense, they erred in failing to accord the State a sufﬁcient margin of ap-
preciation to determine for itself whether the measures taken were the ‘only
means’ of safeguarding the State’s interest. In LG&E Energy Corp v
Argentina, the tribunal accepted Argentina’s plea of necessity in signiﬁcant
part because it considered that Argentina had been in the best position to know
what measures were truly necessary to meet the crisis it faced. Thus, even
though there may have been alternative measures which Argentina could have
taken to address the crisis, the Tribunal would not second-guess the State:
This was not merely a period of ‘economic problems’ or ‘business cycle ﬂuctu-
ation’ as Claimants described. Extremely severe crises in the economic, political
and social sectors reached their apex and converged in December 2001, threat-
ening total collapse of the Government and the Argentine State . . .. Claimants
133 CMS, paras 322–324. Accord, Enron, paras 305–309.
134 CMS, paras 328–329. Accord, Enron, para 312.
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contend that the necessity defense should not be applied here because the mea-
sures implemented by Argentina were not the only means available to respond
to the crisis. The Tribunal rejects this assertion . . . A State may have several
responses at its disposal to maintain public order or protect its essential security
interests. In this sense, it is recognized that Argentina’s suspension of the
calculation of tariffs in U.S. dollars and the PPI adjustment of tariffs was a
legitimate way of protecting its social and economic system. The Tribunal has
determined that Argentina’s enactment of the Emergency Law was a necessary
and legitimate measure on the part of the Argentine Government.135
The different approaches taken to the doctrine of necessity by the Argentina
tribunals represent a wider debate in international law about the applicability
of a European-style margin of appreciation in the judicial and arbitral review
of State action.136 While it is beyond the scope of this article to address this
emerging debate in detail, it is clear that how a tribunal or court resolves this
basic question of approach may signiﬁcantly affect the availability of the
necessity plea.
Lastly, it should be noted that even if the United Kingdom were able
to establish a necessity defense with regards to the Bradford & Bingley
nationalization, the condition of necessity only justiﬁes the temporary non-
performance of international obligations.137 Once the conditions establishing
the necessity have passed, the State must resume performance of its obli-
gations. Accordingly, even if a situation of necessity attached to the Bradford
& Bingley nationalization, ultimately the obligation on the United Kingdom to
make market value compensation will need to be met.
V. CONCLUSION
Litigation regarding Northern Rock has begun. On 8 May 2008 an applic-
ation for judicial review of the CSO was ﬁled in London on behalf of a
group of individual shareholders from the United Kingdom.138 On the same
day, SRM Global Master Fund LLP, a Cayman Islands hedge fund (and
Northern Rock’s largest shareholder), also ﬁled an application for judicial
review of the CSO.139 RAB Capital plc, a London-based hedge fund, ﬁled its
own application on 16 May 2008, and on 23 May, Legal & General Group,
135 LG&E, paras 231 & 239–40.
136 See, eg Y Shany, ‘Towards a General Margin of Appreciation in International Law,’ 16 Eur
J Int’l L 907 (2006).
137 Art 27, International Law Commission, Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for
Internationally Wrongful Acts, in Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of Its
Fifty-third Session, UN GAOR, 56th Sess., Supp. No. 10, at 43, UN Doc. A/56/10 (2001), re-
printed in J Crawford, The International Law Commission’s Articles on State Responsibility:
Introduction, Text and Commentaries (2002).
138 See W Lawson, Chairman, Northern Rock Shareholders Action Group, A Note on the
Northern Rock Legal Action by Shareholders (13 June 2008), available at http://www.
uksa.org.uk/NRK_Legal_Case.pdf. 139 ibid.
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another UK-based institutional investor, joined the proceedings as an ‘inter-
ested party’.140 Thus far, however, none of Northern Rock’s non-UK based
shareholders have brought challenges against the CSO.141 Indeed, the
‘independent valuer’ called for by the CSO was only appointed in September
2008.142
It remains to be seen, therefore, whether the issues raised by the CSO and
the Bradford & Bingley nationalization will ever come before a court or a
tribunal143 and whether the United Kingdom will be called upon to answer the
questions of international law raised by its actions. As the foregoing analysis
indicates, there may well be a case to answer.
140 Thomson Financial News, L&G joins SRM, RAB Cap in proceedings against Northern
Rock as interested party (23 May 2008).
141 In its action for judicial review, SRM has sought to show, inter alia, that the CSO violates
the protections of Protocol No 1 as it applies to nationals of the expropriating State, viz the
proportionality standard set out in Lithgow and James. See A Note on the Northern Rock Legal
Action by Shareholders at 7–8. SRM apparently has not sought to make the argument that re-
sidents of the Cayman Islands—a British Overseas Territory—ought to be considered as non-UK
nationals for purposes of the European Convention on Human Rights; ibid.
142 Somewhat remarkably, the UK Government did not begin seeking to ﬁll the position until
8 June 2008, nearly four months after the nationalization.
143 Even if they do, it will take some time. Before an action in the European Court of Human
Rights may be brought, local remedies in the United Kingdom must ﬁrst be exhausted. See
European Convention on Human Rights, Art 35. And while, generally speaking, a BIT arbitration
would avoid the ‘exhaustion of local remedies’ rule, as a practical matter foreign investors will
not seek recourse to BIT procedures until a concrete valuation has been produced under the CSO
mechanism. See Helnan International Hotels A/S v Arab Republic of Egypt, ICSID Case No ARB/
05/19, Award (3 July 2008); Generation Ukraine, Inc v Ukraine, ICSID Case No ARB/00/9,
Award (16 Sept. 2003) (ﬁnding the failure to pursue any local remedies relevant to the determi-
nation of whether there was an expropriation at all).
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